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ABSTRACT 
We investigate the changing risk-relevance of securitized subprime, other non-conforming, and 
commercial mortgages for sponsor-originators (S-Os) during the recent financial crisis. Using 
volatility of realized stock returns, option-implied volatility, and credit spreads, we observe a 
pronounced increase in the risk-relevance for subprime securitizations as early as 2006. 
Furthermore, reflecting the evolution of the financial crisis in waves, we find that investors 
recognized the increased credit riskiness of other non-conforming and commercial mortgage 
securitizations as the financial crisis progressed. Additional analyses show that the risk-relevance 
results vary cross-sectionally with issue characteristics such as monoline credit-enhancement and 
the existence of special servicers or B-piece buyers. Our results potentially inform current 
debates on the opacity of securitization structures, and highlight that the evaluation of risk-
relevance of securitized assets should take into account heterogeneity in collateral and structure 
characteristics, both cross-sectionally and inter-temporally. 
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THE RISK RELEVANCE OF SECURITIZATIONS DURING THE 
RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The decade leading up to the recent financial crisis witnessed a rapid growth in asset 
securitization volumes.1 Securitization is used by firms to, inter alia, transfer credit risk of assets 
such as mortgages and credit card loans off their balance sheet. However, observers such as 
Gorton and Souleles (2005) have argued that the securitizers (often referred to as sponsor-
originators or S-Os) continue to partly retain the credit risks of securitized assets through 
retained on-balance sheet interests, explicit contractual agreements, as well as implicit moral 
recourse.2 
We investigate the changing risk-relevance of securitized subprime, other non-
conforming (Alt-A residential mortgages, loans with high loan-to-value ratios, etc., which we 
refer  to  as  “other non-conforming”) and commercial mortgages, as the financial crisis unfolded, 
from the point of view of equity and bond investors of sponsor-originators. Consistent with prior 
literature on risk-relevance of off-balance sheet positions (e.g., Bowman 1980, Dhaliwal 1986, 
Niu and Richardson 2006, Chen, Liu, and Ryan 2008, and Barth, Ormazabal, and Taylor 2011), 
we consider securitized assets to be risk-relevant if they are associated with the equity or credit 
risk of securitizing firms (see also Ryan 2012).3 We build upon the insights in Chen et al. (2008) 
and Barth et al. (2011) that the level of credit risk of securitized assets retained by S-Os varies by 
                                                          
1 For an indication of securitization volumes, see data on US ABS Issuance and Outstanding, compiled by the 
“Securities   Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)”.   SIFMA   has   made   this   data   available   at:     
http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx 
2 Consistent with these risk-retention arguments, the empirical literature in accounting and finance (e.g., Niu and 
Richardson 2006, Chen, Liu, and Ryan 2008, Barth, Ormazabal, and Taylor 2011, Dionne and Harchaoui 2003, and 
Hänsel and Krahnen 2007) has documented that securitized assets are, to varying degrees, relevant to the risk 
assessment of S-Os by their equity and bond investors. 
3 Specifically, we test whether the equity and/or credit risk of the S-Os is explained by the extent of securitized 
mortgage  assets’  credit  risk  retained by the S-Os.  
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the type of assets that constitute the collateral and is related to (a) the riskiness of the underlying 
securitized assets, and (b) specific structural features of the securitization entities (such as credit 
enhancement and implicit recourse), which determine the level of risk-retention. We extend this 
literature by examining whether the risk-relevance for a given level and type of securitized asset 
changes inter-temporally with changes in the credit riskiness (i.e., the riskiness of cash flows 
generated by the assets) of the underlying asset class. In our setting, the riskiest type of collateral 
is subprime mortgage collateral. Prior studies such as Chen et al. (2008) were not able to obtain 
data on subprime securitizations, and their analysis preceded the financial crisis. Our study is one 
of the first to examine changing risk-relevance for subprime securitizations as the subprime crisis 
approached and progressed. 
Our identification strategy takes advantage of a unique research setting provided by the 
recent financial crisis. Observers such as Ryan (2008) and Gorton (2009) have argued that the 
financial crisis evolved in waves, with the credit riskiness of certain asset classes such as 
subprime mortgages spiking up before other mortgage classes such as Alt-A and commercial 
mortgages. Steep declines and increased volatility in the price levels of publicly observable 
benchmarks such as the ABX index confirmed that investors were aware of the increasing credit 
risk of subprime mortgage markets by late 2006 / early 2007. Thus, we explore whether the 
equity and bond investors of S-Os recognized the changing riskiness of securitizations of 
subprime and other risky mortgages, as the financial crisis evolved. 
We infer risk-relevance by examining the association between observed measures of firm 
risk (volatility of realized stock returns, option-implied volatility, and credit spreads), and 
mortgage securitization levels. We observe a pronounced increase in risk-relevance for subprime 
securitizations in 2006. Thus, by as early as 2006, equity and bond investors of sponsor-
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originators recognized the increasing credit riskiness of the subprime mortgage collateral, and 
the retention of that increased credit risk by S-Os. This is consistent with the observation in Ryan 
(2008, page 1619) that problems with subprime mortgages were apparent to market participants 
by the middle of 2006. Further, we find that equity and bond investors recognized the increased 
riskiness of other non-conforming and commercial mortgage securitizations in 2007 and 2008, 
respectively, as the riskiness of the underlying asset classes became apparent later on during the 
crisis. Our results reflect that the crisis evolved in waves (see for example, Ryan 2008), with the 
riskiness of asset classes such as other non-conforming and commercial mortgages becoming 
apparent later than asset classes such as subprime mortgages.  
In additional analyses involving the equity risk of securitizing firms, we show that the 
risk-relevance results vary in cross-section with issue characteristics such as monoline credit-
enhancement and the existence of a special servicer for commercial mortgage securitizations. 
Our results indicate that the risk-relevance of securitizations depends not only on collateral credit 
riskiness, but also on the structure of the securitization entity which determines the level of risk-
retention by the S-O. 
Our study is related to the intense and still ongoing debate on asset securitizations and the 
recent crisis. In particular, the extent to which the riskiness of mortgage securitizations was 
assessable by market participants has been an actively debated topic during and after the crisis. 
Observers (e.g., Gorton 2009) have argued that mortgage securitizations, which often resulted in 
an off-balance-sheet treatment for the securitized assets, were responsible for exacerbating the 
effects of the recent financial crisis. The general tenor of this claim is that financial institutions 
created and spread risk in an opaque manner through the proliferation of off-balance-sheet 
entities.  
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The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has responded to calls for increased  
transparency (e.g., Ryan 2008; Gorton 2009) by, among other initiatives, promulgating two new 
sets of accounting guidelines to improve the financial reporting and accounting treatment for off-
balance-sheet entities — SFAS  166  and  SFAS  167.  These  guidelines  effectively  “killed  the  Q”,  
or eliminated the off-balance-sheet (hereafter, OBS) treatment accorded to Qualified Special 
Purpose Entities (QSPEs). Our research evidence on the risk-relevance of subprime 
securitizations as far back as 2006 corroborates this move by FASB, at least as far as subprime 
securitizations were concerned.   
In addition to accounting standard setting, our results have regulatory policy implications.  
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 requires Federal banking agencies to 
promulgate rules that mandate, with some exceptions, credit-risk retention of assets securitized 
by sponsors/originators. However, the statute offers some flexibility which has been supported 
by observers such as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2010). These 
observers have questioned the merits of an overarching mandatory risk-retention requirement, 
arguing that there is considerable heterogeneity among asset classes underlying the securitization 
structures, and that any mandatory risk-retention requirement be tailored to each major class of 
securitized assets. Our results indicate cross-sectional and inter-temporal heterogeneity in risk-
retention between securitized asset classes such as subprime, other non-conforming, and 
commercial mortgages, and thus inform the debate surrounding the enactment of this law. 
Our study also complements a recent paper by Amiram, Landsman, Peasnell, and 
Shakespeare (2011). Using value relevance tests, they report results consistent with equity 
investors valuing S-O equities as if the S-Os exercised their default option, rather than the MBS 
investors exercising the put option implied by moral recourse. Our study differs from Amiram et 
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al. (2011) in several aspects. First, Amiram et al. (2011) report on-average results, across all 
types of collateral. Their evidence may not extend to the specific types of credit-risky mortgage 
collateral that we examine. In particular, the Y-9C data used by them likely includes prime 
mortgages guaranteed by government-sponsored entities. These guarantees performed well 
during the crisis due to U.S. government backing.  Opacity problems regarding collateral quality 
were especially severe for subprime and other non-conforming mortgages. As some recent 
lawsuits   (for   example,   Bank   of   America’s   proposed $8.5 billion settlement with various 
securitization parties including investors)4 have shown, the increase in risk relevance could be 
driven   not   only   by   moral   recourse   but   also   by   the   so   called   “put   back”   claims   based   on  
representations and warranties about underlying asset quality by the S-Os. 
Our findings are intuitive, but not tautological. On the contrary, our results may be 
somewhat surprising in that investors were able to incorporate the credit riskiness of securitized 
mortgage assets into their risk assessments with the generally poor disclosure environment that 
preceded the SFAS 166/167 disclosure requirements. Ryan (2008) notes the general opacity that 
characterized subprime securitization disclosures in the pre-SFAS 166/167 era, and calls for 
research   evidence   on   “whether   and   how   firms’   economic   leverage   and risk arising from off-
balance-sheet subprime positions and on-balance sheet but concentrated-risk subprime positions 
are assessable from their financial reports and other publicly  available  information.”  We use the 
Asset-Backed   Alert’s   database   of   securitization issues done between 1995 and 2009. This 
database has been available for purchase by market observers during our sample period. Data 
from this and similar databases were in the public domain, and investors were free to calculate 
cumulative securitizations by sponsor-originators much as we do. Our results imply that  
                                                          
4 http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/09_-
_September/Banks_beware__Time_is_ripe_for_MBS_breach-of-contract_suits/ 
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investors were, at least to some extent, able to decipher deteriorating housing prices, average 
interest rate reset propensities, and likely defaults, and incorporate the risk-relevance of all this in 
equity and debt pricing for the S-Os.5, 6 
The remainder of our study consists of the following sections. Section 2 reviews the 
relevant literature and develops the hypotheses; Section 3 describes the empirical models and 
methodology; Section 4 describes the data and sample; Section 5 discusses the empirical results; 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. Background on Basic Structural Features of Mortgage Securitizations 
Figure 1 describes a basic securitization structure. To keep the discussion brief, we 
describe subprime mortgage securitizations only, although the arguments apply more generally 
to other types of collateral. The term subprime refers to home mortgages with low credit (FICO) 
scores, typically 620 or less (see Hull 2009) and low down payments. Figure 1 illustrates a 
commonly observed securitization structure where the lender (the originator of the loans) is also 
the  sponsor  of  the  securitization  entity  (hence  the  term  “sponsor-originator”  or  “S-O”). The S-O 
originates the mortgage loans with or without the help of a mortgage broker. To securitize the 
mortgage loans, the S-O creates a trust which becomes the owner of the loans. The trust is 
referred to as a Special Purpose Entity (or SPE) and is a bankruptcy-remote passive structure 
created with the purpose of holding the securitized assets and conveying cash flows to and from 
the various concerned parties. The loans in the trust could be combined with loans from other 
sponsor-originators to achieve the benefits of diversification, so several thousand mortgages 
                                                          
5See   for   example,   “Citigroup’s   $1.1   Trillion   of   Mysterious   Assets   Shadow   Earnings”,   Bradley   Keoun,  
Bloomberg.com, June 13, 2008.  
6Note that we do not make any claims or assumptions about the extent of market efficiency. In other words, our 
results do not speak to whether the capital market assessment of credit-risk retention related to securitized assets was 
adequate or accurate. 
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typically reside in one trust. The S-Os often retain servicing rights for the securitized loans. 
However, in some securitizations, the servicer could be a separate entity. The servicer is usually 
responsible for collecting loan payments (principal and interests, or P&I in Figure 1) from 
borrowers and remitting these payments to the issuer for distribution to investors. Mortgage 
backed securities (MBS) are then created out of various tranches, with the least risky to riskiest 
tranches typically being the senior (AAA rated), mezzanine (rated AA and below) and equity 
tranches, respectively. The ratings are generally assigned by one of the major credit rating 
agencies  (Moody’s,  S&P,  or  Fitch).  The MBS could then be purchased through underwriters or 
placement agents by investors such as hedge funds and pension funds. The securitization trust or 
its investors could, at their option, purchase insurance from a third party such as a monoline bond 
insurer as an external credit enhancement. As explained by Hull (2009, page 5), the senior and 
mezzanine tranches were in turn often sold to yet another SPE, as part of a second stage 
securitization in order to create collateralized debt obligations or CDOs.   
While the basic structure is similar across securitizations of different asset classes, there 
are many nuances that distinguish them from each other, often with meaningful economic 
consequences. We discuss and analyze two such features in later analyses – external credit 
enhancement by a monoline bond insurer and the possibility of B-piece retention by a special 
servicer of a commercial mortgage securitization entity. 
2.2. Risk-relevance of Mortgage Securitizations during the Financial Crisis 
Our main predictions stem from the following key observation in Chen et al. (2008): 
“Issuers’  reported  assets  and  liabilities  concentrate  the  risk  of  the  off-balance sheet securitized 
financial assets if and only if two conditions hold: (1) the off-balance sheet securitized financial 
assets have risk and (2) issuers retain first-loss interests in the securitized assets that they record 
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on their balance sheets at relatively small value (contractual interests) or no value (implicit 
recourse).”   Building   on   this   observation, firms’   equity   and   credit   risk   should be positively 
related to the credit riskiness of the assets that they hold or are exposed to. Asset securitizations 
are used to, inter alia, transfer credit risky assets off the balance sheet of S-Os to the investors of 
the asset-backed securities issued by the securitization entity. If the credit risk transfer is 
incomplete, or in other words, the S-Os continue to retain a portion of the credit risks pertaining 
to the securitized assets, then it follows that equity and bond investors of the S-O would consider 
the credit riskiness of the securitized assets in their risk assessment of the S-O. 
The financial crisis time period analyzed in this study allows us to examine the change in 
risk-relevance over time. Observers such as Ryan (2008) and Gorton (2009) highlight the fact 
that the crisis evolved in waves, with certain collateral types such as subprime mortgages being 
affected earlier than others such as commercial mortgages.7 During each successive stage, 
collateral values declined with increased severity and more asset classes got affected. We explain 
below the early phases of the subprime crisis during 2006 to 2008 and the subsequent 
transmission of shocks to non-subprime asset classes during 2008 to 2010. 
In particular, Ryan (2008) describes the evolution of the subprime crisis during 2007-
2008 in multiple stages. Even before the crisis began, problems with subprime mortgages started 
becoming evident by the middle of 2006 (see also Demyanyk and Hemert 2011). Ryan (2008) 
considers the announcement of significant losses on subprime mortgage positions by New 
Century Financial and HSBC Holdings in February 2007 to be the beginning of the first phase of 
the crisis. The period between February and July 2007 was marked by further deterioration in 
subprime mortgage market conditions. Ryan (2008) considers July to October 2007 as the second 
                                                          
7Note that we are interested in the waves of the financial crisis as it related to declines in values of asset classes used 
as collateral in mortgage securitizations. We refer the reader to Gorton and Metrick (2012) for guidance on the more 
general economy-wide evolution of the crisis. 
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wave of the subprime crisis. This period witnessed a significant decline in market-based 
indicators of the health of the subprime mortgage market such as the junior tranches of the ABX 
index. The third phase of the subprime crisis began in October/November 2007 with the 
announcement of billions of dollars of write-downs  by  firms  holding  hitherto  safe  “super  senior”  
CDO positions. Notable among write-down announcements were the 8-K and 10-Q filings of 
Merrill Lynch and Citigroup. The third phase also witnessed further steep declines in the values 
of junior and senior credit indices such as the ABX index. The next phase of the subprime crisis 
raised concerns about contagion to non-subprime asset classes. The period from January to 
March 2008 reflected further deterioration in subprime exposures of a wide array of market 
participants, including investors and financial guarantors.  
 Alt-A (or Alternative-A) mortgages are similar to subprime mortgages in that they are 
“non-conforming”  and  are  not  backed  by  Government Sponsored Enterprises. However, Alt-A 
borrowers typically had better credit standings compared to subprime, but shared the 
characteristic of lower documentation of underwriting criteria. The market took cognizance of 
the rising wave of delinquencies on Alt-A mortgages and the prices of Alt-A mortgage backed 
securities started declining sharply in early 2008 (IMF Financial Stability Report, October 2008). 
The prices of securities backed by Jumbo mortgages (grouped with Alt-A as “other non-
conforming” in our study) declined in tandem, albeit with a slight lag, with securities backed by 
Alt-A mortgages. 
 The deterioration in the Commercial Real Estate (CRE) markets followed subprime and 
other non-conforming mortgages and continues to date. Reflecting increasing contagion across 
asset classes, delinquencies on Commercial Real Estate (CRE) also started rising steadily since 
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2007. By early 2009, observers such as the IMF were pointing towards massive write-downs of 
CRE-backed assets (IMF Financial Stability Report Market Update, January 2009).  
If the credit-riskiness of the collateral changes over time, then it follows that the risk-
relevance for a given level and type of securitized asset will also change inter-temporally with the 
credit riskiness of the underlying assets. Based on the discussion above, we expect to find an 
increase in risk-relevance of subprime securitizations earlier than other non-conforming and 
commercial mortgage-backed securitizations. Thus, we state the following hypotheses (in 
alternate form): 
H1 (a): Consistent with the evolution of subprime crisis in waves, we expect to find an 
increase in risk-relevance of subprime securitizations during 2006-2008. 
H1 (b): Consistent with the evolution of the financial crisis in waves, we expect to find an 
increase in risk-relevance of subprime securitizations earlier than other non-conforming 
and commercial mortgage-backed securitizations.  
2.3. External Credit Enhancement 
In addition to credit-enhancement through tranching, securitizations may also include 
credit enhancement from external parties – often monoline bond insurance companies.8 
Monoline credit enhancements,  also  referred  to  as  “credit  wraps”,  could either assume the form 
of a financial guarantee or a written credit derivative. In their simplest form, these monoline 
credit-wraps guarantee timely payment of interest and ultimate return of principal for a certain 
class of bonds. The guarantee is typically unconditional and irrevocable. Rating agencies 
conferred   “AAA”   rating   on   these   guaranteed bonds based on the financial strength of the 
monoline guarantor. While the structural form may vary for different securitizations, the 
guarantees are structured to pay off the investors when notification of a credit event occurs 
                                                          
8 Monoline insurance companies were traditionally in the business of insuring investors from losses in the municipal 
bonds market, but forayed into structured credit instruments before the financial crisis. Major monoline insurance 
companies included MBIA, FSA, FGIC, and AMBAC. 
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(typically a default by the issuer). We argue that external credit enhancement from monoline 
bond insurance companies shifts at least a part of the risk away from the sponsor-originator to 
these third-party guarantors. To the extent that the monoline was perceived by investors to be 
able to perform on its guarantee, the sponsor-originator was at least partially off the hook for the 
guaranteed portion of the structure. On an ex ante basis, this assumption seems reasonable as 
most  of  the  monolines  were  rated  “A”  or  better  prior to the crisis. Problems regarding monoline 
financial health became apparent later in 2007. Thus, we expect the risk-shifting effect to 
mitigate as the crisis progressed. We state the following hypothesis: 
H2: The increase in risk-relevance of mortgage securitizations for sponsor-originators is 
mitigated by third-party credit enhancement such as a guarantee by a monoline bond 
insurer for a part of the securitization structure. 
2.4. “B-piece”    holder  in  Commercial  Mortgage Securitizations 
We focus on a unique institutional feature of commercial mortgage securitizations. 
Commercial mortgage securitizations are unique in the sense that many of these structures 
include a risk-retention feature in the form of a B-piece holder (the B-piece is the junior tranche 
of the securitization). While we do not have access to the exact identity of the B-piece buyer in 
our dataset, we rely on the institutional fact that in most commercial mortgage securitizations, 
the B-piece is usually purchased by the so-called  “special  servicers”  (see for example, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2010). The special servicers deal with loans that are 
troubled or face imminent default or other problems for the deal. The Federal Reserve report 
notes that B-piece buyers may also conduct due diligence on individual loans during the initial 
structuring of the commercial mortgage securitization, and may have more information than 
other investors about the quality of the underlying pool of assets. Thus, both due to retained 
interests and implicit recourse reasons, we expect the risk-relevance of commercial mortgage 
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securitizations structures to be enhanced for sponsors which are also the special servicers. In 
other words, a separate special servicer is likely to shift the risk away from the sponsor. We state 
the following hypothesis: 
H3: The increase in risk-relevance of commercial mortgage securitizations for sponsor-
originators is enhanced if the sponsor is also the special servicer. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
We develop our empirical tests based on Chen et al. (2008) and Barth et al. (2011). To 
infer the extent of credit risk of the securitized assets retained by S-Os, we examine the 
association between the level of securitized assets (by type: subprime, other non-conforming, and 
commercial) and measures of the S-O’s  equity  and  credit  risk.  Consistent  with  prior  literature  on 
risk-relevance of off-balance sheet positions (e.g., Bowman 1980, Dhaliwal 1986, Ely 1995, Niu 
and Richardson 2006, Chen et al. 2008, and Barth et al. 2011), we consider securitized assets to 
be risk-relevant if they are associated with S-Os’ measures of equity or credit risk. We initially 
describe our methodology for measures of the S-O’s   equity   risk,   and   we   later   turn   to  
corroborating tests using measures of the S-O’s  credit  risk  and  equity analysts’ earnings forecast 
dispersion.  
For equity risk, we begin with the following basic specification: 
𝜎ா = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ
ௌ
஺ +   𝜀                                                      (1) 
In Equation (1), A is the book value of total firm assets, S is the cumulative value of 
securitized assets, and σE is the equity volatility. Thus, S/A represents the extent of securitized 
assets. Under the null hypothesis of no risk-relevance of securitizations (an implication of true 
sale accounting), β1 will be zero. If, however, investors consider the securitized assets as being 
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risk-relevant, then β1 will be positive. We utilize the insight that the magnitude of β1 in Equation 
(1) is indicative of the extent of credit-riskiness of the underlying collateral (i.e., the level of 
asset volatility). Accordingly, we expect the economic and statistical significance of β1 in 
Equation (1) to vary cross-sectionally with the riskiness of the underlying collateral, and inter-
temporally during the course of the crisis as the credit-riskiness of different types of collateral 
increased.9 It follows that if we decompose S into various sub-components, such as subprime, 
other non-conforming and commercial mortgage securitizations, the coefficient on each sub-
component in Equation (1) should be reflective of the riskiness of the underlying asset classes. 
Finally, as the riskiness of these asset classes shifts over time, we should observe a 
corresponding inter-temporal shift in their coefficients. 
The methodology followed in this paper closely resembles Chen et al. (2008), who 
measure a banks’  total  equity  risk  using realized stock return volatility over the quarter following 
the quarter under consideration. In addition to realized stock return volatility, we use implied 
volatility derived from exchange-traded options prices.10 Thus, we estimate the following firm-
quarter-level panel regression: 
(𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑇, 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑉91)  ௜,௧ାଵ   =   𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐿𝐸𝑉௜,௧   + 𝛽ଶ𝑆𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧   +  ∑ 𝛽ଷ௝𝑆𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧ ×
௝ୀଶ଴଴ଽ
௝ୀଶ଴଴଺
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝑗 +  𝛽ସ𝑁𝐶𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧   +   ∑ 𝛽ହ௝𝑁𝐶𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧ × 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝑗௝ୀଶ଴଴ଽ௝ୀଶ଴଴଺   + 𝛽଺𝐶𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧   +
                                                          
9 An alternative method to derive similar predictions appeals to the finance asset pricing literature which documents 
a positive relation between equity volatility and financial leverage (e.g., Christie 1982, Shwert 1989, and Aydemir et 
al. 2007). Given that most securitization structures are thinly capitalized, the S/A ratio can be viewed to be 
analogous to an off-balance sheet leverage ratio. The simplest form of such a specification follows Christie (1982), 
who documents a positive relation between leverage and equity volatility. With further simplifying assumptions, the 
coefficient on leverage can be written as a positive function of the underlying asset volatility. Thus, both this 
approach and our approach lead to the same prediction – that the risk relevance coefficient on S/A increases as the 
underlying asset volatility (or in other words, the riskiness of the underlying asset collateral) increases.  
10 Implied volatility is a forward-looking  measure  and   reflects   investors’   ex ante perception on equity risk and is 
documented to be closely related to credit spreads (Hull, Nelken and White 2004). According to Merton (1974) both 
credit spreads and implied volatility are positively related to financial leverage. 
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  ∑ 𝛽଻௝𝐶𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧ × 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝑗௝ୀଶ଴଴ଽ௝ୀଶ଴଴଺ +  𝛽଼𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐵𝑆௜,௧ +   𝛽ଽ𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵ଴𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵଵ𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑆௜,௧ +
𝛽ଵଶ𝑅𝐸𝑇0609௜ + 𝛽ଵଷ𝑅𝐼௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵସ𝑉𝐼𝑋௧ + 𝜀௜,௧                       (2) 
In Equation (2), the subscripts (i, t) indicate firms and quarters, respectively. Appendix A 
provides key variable definitions as well as the relevant data sources. The main dependent 
variables, STDRETi,t+1 11 and IMPV91i,t+1 are defined as, respectively, the standard deviation of 
daily stock returns, and the average of the daily option-implied volatility at the quarter-end from 
standardized at-the-money put and call options with 91 days duration (both measured over the 
following quarter). Figure 2 depicts the measurement timing for the key variables used in our 
tests. As seen from the figure, most of our explanatory variables are measured ex ante with 
respect to our dependent variables. In other words, the dependent variables are all measured in 
the quarter following the quarter under consideration. We measure one important control 
variable – cumulative stock returns for each firm from 2006 to 2009 (RET0609i) – using ex post 
data due to limited disclosures and the resulting challenges in constructing an ex ante measure of 
on balance sheet exposure to the risky asset classes that were affected during the financial 
crisis.12 
LEVi,t is the leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities minus deposits divided by total 
assets. SPMBSi,t, NCMBSi,t, CMBSi,t, and OTHBSi,t are defined respectively as the amounts of 
subprime, other non-conforming, commercial mortgage, and other consumer and commercial 
securitization issues over the prior five years, scaled by total assets. We choose an accumulation 
period of five years based on Hull and White (2010) and He, Qian and Strahan (2010), who 
report mean/median weighted average life of mortgages-backed securities as approximately five 
                                                          
11 The definition of STDRET follows Chen et al. (2008). However, the results are robust to scaling the variable by its 
mean measured over the same time period. 
12 Untabulated analyses indicate that the results are similar if we omit this control variable. 
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years after taking into account factors such as prepayment.13 In a sensitivity test, we have 
repeated the analyses based on the amounts of all the prior securitization issues by asset class and 
obtained qualitatively similar results. In addition, we follow the previous literature and include 
several control variables. DISPi,t, our proxy for general uncertainty facing investors, is the equity 
analyst forecast dispersion calculated as the coefficient of variation of analysts’ estimates of one 
year ahead annual earnings measured during the last month of each quarter. LOGMVi,t is the 
natural   logarithm   of   the   firm’s  market   value   of   equity.   STDEPSi,t, our proxy for the inherent 
volatility  of  the  firm’s  assets on the balance sheet, is the coefficient of variation of earnings per 
share excluding extraordinary items over the past 5 years. YEAR_2006, YEAR_2007, 
YEAR_2008, and YEAR_2009 are indicator variables for the years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009. 
For each of our test variables, we include interaction terms with year indicator variables for 2006 
to 2009 to observe the shift in risk-relevance of these collateral types (e.g., 
SPMBSi,t×YEAR_2006). In addition to using these year dummies to test for interaction effects, 
we also include them as main effects to control for fixed effects related to the passage of time. In 
addition, we use the quarter-end VIX index (VIXt) as a forward-looking macro-economic control 
variable. Another important control variable is the firm-quarter level of retained interests in 
securitizations (RIi,t). Finally, we also control for industry fixed effects.  
As our primary research question involves testing the changing risk-relevance of 
mortgage securitizations over time, we provide another approach to validate our methodology. In 
addition to the use of year indicators in Equation (2), we also employ an alternate methodology 
which takes advantage of the differential devaluation of various mortgage subclasses during the 
financial crisis. The basic idea is similar to that in Equation (2) – the risk-relevance of a 
                                                          
13 Note that this time window already includes the potential effects of prepayments. Accordingly, we have not 
adjusted for this further. 
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particular class of mortgage assets is expected to increase as the credit risk of that asset class 
increases. We measure the increasing credit risk of the mortgage asset classes of interest to us 
using the Bloomberg 60+ day delinquency indices for subprime, Alt-A, and commercial 
mortgages, respectively. In other words, instead of analyzing the slope shift coefficients for each 
year, we analyze the slope shift on one composite dynamic variable – the extent of devaluation 
of the asset class as implied by increasing delinquencies.14 Thus, we also estimate the following 
firm-quarter-level panel regression: 
(𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑇, 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑉91)  ௜,௧ାଵ   =
𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐿𝐸𝑉௜,௧   + 𝛽ଶ𝑆𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝑆𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧ × 𝐷𝐸𝑉_𝑆𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑆ଶ଴଴଺,௧ +  𝛽ସ𝑁𝐶𝑀𝐵𝑆ଶ଴଴଺,௧   +
𝛽ହ𝑁𝐶𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧ × 𝐷𝐸𝑉_𝑁𝐶𝑀𝐵𝑆ଶ଴଴଺,௧   + 𝛽଺𝐶𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧ +  𝛽଻𝐶𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧ × 𝐷𝐸𝑉_𝐶𝑀𝐵𝑆ଶ଴଴଺,௧ +
𝛽଼𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐵𝑆௜,௧ +   𝛽ଽ𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵ଴𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵଵ𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑆௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵଶ𝑅𝐸𝑇0609௜ + 𝛽ଵଷ𝑅𝐼௜,௧ +
𝛽ଵସ𝑉𝐼𝑋௧ + 𝜀௜,௧ାଵ               (3) 
DEV_SPMBS2006,t, DEV_NCMBS2006,t, and DEV_CMBS2006,t are the cumulative 
devaluations of the Bloomberg 60+ day delinquency indices (for subprime, Alt-A, and 
commercial mortgages, respectively) from the beginning of 2006 to the end of quarter t, as a 
percentage of their total devaluation over 2006 to 2009. Zeros are assigned to years prior to 
2006. Positive and significant coefficients on the interaction terms SPMBS×DEV_SPMBS2006,t, 
NCMBS×DEV_NCMBS2006,t, and CMBS×DEV_CMBS2006,t would imply that the risk-relevance 
of securitizations of a particular asset type increases as the performance indicators of that asset 
class deteriorate. In other words, the Equation (3) is intended to provide a validation check for 
the research design in Equation (2). 
                                                          
14 Devaluation in a particular delinquency index implies increased delinquencies, and accordingly increased credit 
risk, in the corresponding asset class. 
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The tests of H2 and H3 build upon Equation (2) and employ a straightforward 
methodology involving interaction terms to measure the incremental effect of monoline credit 
enhancement and special servicers, respectively. Accordingly, we discuss the set-up of those 
regressions when we discuss the empirical results in Section 5. 
We provide further corroboration for our risk-relevance findings by using alternative 
dependent variables. First, following the approach of Barth et al. (2010), we use corporate bond 
yield spreads from the primary and secondary bond markets as alternative dependent variables. 
Using the primary bond market data, the dependent variable is SPREADi,t+1, defined as the 
weighted average yield for new bonds issued during the subsequent quarter, minus the yield on 
U.S. treasury bills with corresponding closest maturity. The dependent variable using the 
secondary bond trading data, SPREAD2i,t+1, is defined as the weighted average yield for bonds 
traded during the subsequent quarter, minus the yield on U.S. treasury bills that are closest in 
maturity. The regression set-up is similar to Equation (2), except that we additionally control for 
bond characteristics, including amount, maturity, coupon rate, and number of covenants 
(LOGAMTi,t+1, MATURITYi,t+1, and NUMCOVi,t+1 for the primary bond market tests, and 
LOGAMT2i,t+1, MATURITY2i,t+1, COUPON2i,t+1 and NUMCOV2i,t+1 for the secondary market 
tests). Thus, our regression model using the primary bond market data is as follows: 
  𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷௜,௧ାଵ   =   𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐿𝐸𝑉௜,௧   + 𝛽ଶ𝑆𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧   +   ∑ 𝛽ଷ௝𝑆𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧ × 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅௝
௝ୀଶ଴଴ଽ
௝ୀଶ଴଴଺ +
𝛽ସ𝑁𝐶𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧   +   ∑ 𝛽ହ௝𝑁𝐶𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧ × 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅௝௝ୀଶ଴଴ଽ௝ୀଶ଴଴଺   + 𝛽଺𝐶𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧   +   ∑ 𝛽଻௝𝐶𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧ ×
௝ୀଶ଴଴ଽ
௝ୀଶ଴଴଺
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅௝ +  𝛽଼𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐵𝑆௜,௧ +   𝛽ଽ𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵ଴𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵଵ𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑆௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵଶ𝑅𝐸𝑇0609௜ +
𝛽ଵଷ𝑅𝐼௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵସ𝑉𝐼𝑋௧ + 𝛽ଵହ𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌௜,௧ାଵ + 𝛽ଵ଺𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐴𝑀𝑇௜,௧ାଵ + 𝛽ଵ଻𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑉௜,௧ାଵ + 𝜀௜,௧ାଵ       
           (4a)      
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Our regression model for tests using the secondary bond market data is as follows: 
𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷2  ௜,௧ାଵ   =   𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐿𝐸𝑉௜,௧   + 𝛽ଶ𝑆𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧   +   ∑ 𝛽ଷ௝𝑆𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧ × 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝑗
௝ୀଶ଴଴ଽ
௝ୀଶ଴଴଺ +
  𝛽ସ𝑁𝐶𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧   +   ∑ 𝛽ହ௝𝑁𝐶𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧ × 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝑗௝ୀଶ଴଴ଽ௝ୀଶ଴଴଺   + 𝛽଺𝐶𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧   +   ∑ 𝛽଻௝𝐶𝑀𝐵𝑆௜,௧ ×
௝ୀଶ଴଴ଽ
௝ୀଶ଴଴଺
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝑗 +  𝛽଼𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐵𝑆௜,௧ +   𝛽ଽ𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵ଴𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑀𝑉௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵଵ𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑆௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵଶ𝑅𝐸𝑇0609௜ +
𝛽ଵଷ𝑅𝐼௜,௧ + 𝛽ଵସ𝑉𝐼𝑋௧ + 𝛽ଵହ𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌2௜,௧ାଵ + 𝛽ଵ଺𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐴𝑀𝑇2௜,௧ାଵ + 𝛽ଵ଻𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑉2௜,௧ାଵ +
𝛽ଵ଼𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑂𝑁2௜,௧ାଵ + 𝜀௜,௧ାଵ                      (4b) 
 Second, we appeal to Cheng et al. (2011) and use equity analysts’ earnings forecast 
dispersion as an alternate dependent variable. To the extent that the increase in perceived 
riskiness of the underlying securitization collateral increases uncertainty among market 
participants about firm value, we expect to obtain similar inferences as earlier using analyst 
dispersion. The research design is otherwise similar to Equation (2), except that we no longer 
include DISPi,t as a control. 
4. DATA AND SAMPLE 
The main data source for the securitization issues used in this study is the Asset-Backed 
Alert (ABS Alert) database compiled by Harrison Scott Publications (HSP). This database 
comprises all securitization issues from 1985 to date which were rated by at least one major 
credit rating agency, including securitizations of residential mortgages, credit cards, and other 
consumer and commercial assets. This database excludes asset-backed commercial paper 
(ABCP) conduits, Structured Investment Vehicles, and commercial mortgage issues. We use data 
from the Commercial Mortgage Alert (CM Alert) database, also maintained by Harrison Scott 
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Publications, to obtain data for commercial mortgage securitization issues.15 We exclude 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) from our analysis, and note that our dataset excludes 
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits and Structured Investment Vehicles. Our 
choice of the ABS Alert database, compared with alternate sources, is dictated by our research 
question. In particular, the ABS Alert database details the securitization issues by type of 
collateral (e.g., subprime). Further, it also includes a number of other fields of interest used in 
this study (e.g., monoline guarantees and special servicers).  
Table 1 provides the sample selection process. We limit our attention to issuances in the 
U.S. by U.S.-based sponsors. Our test period is from 2000 to 2009. We begin the test period 
from 2000 since SFAS 140 became effective from fiscal year 2000 onwards. As the 
measurement of cumulative securitization exposure requires data on a rolling basis for the 
previous five years, we include issues from 1995 onwards. We obtain 12,599 issues between 
1995 and 2009, for which we could match the sponsoring firm manually to Compustat and obtain 
firm-quarter level data. This corresponds to 9,098 firm-quarter observations. The sample size for 
the main regression analyses in this study is lower due to data availability constraints for the 
dependent and control variables. Data on stock returns and stock return volatility is obtained 
from CRSP. Options-implied volatility is obtained from OptionMetrics. Secondary bond spreads 
are calculated using TRACE, while primary bond spreads are obtained from Mergent FISD. 
Equity analyst forecast dispersion is obtained from I/B/E/S. 
An important control variable in our study is the firm-quarter level of retained interests in 
securitizations (RI). We collect the firm-level retained interests amounts from 10Q/10K reports, 
and where available, Y-9C regulatory reports. For U.S. regulated banks that file regulatory Y-9C 
                                                          
15 The Asset-Backed  Alert  database  is  generally  accessible  to  subscribers  of  HSP’s  popular  industry  newsletter.  The  
data have been used by influential regulatory studies such as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
Report (2010). 
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reports quarterly with the Federal Reserve, retained interests by type of interest and type of loan 
are reported in the schedule HC-S. For each firm we measure retained interests as the total of on-
balance sheet retained credit-enhancing interest only strips, subordinated securities, and other 
residual interests. For firms that do not file regulatory Y-9C reports, we hand-collect the retained 
interests amount from their 10Q/10K reports.16 However, even after the adoption of SFAS 140, 
compared to schedule HC-S data, the 10-K/10-Q data are far less standardized and detailed. In 
particular, the RI data are not pro-rated by collateral type, so we can only control for RI at the 
aggregate level for each firm. 
Of descriptive interest, Appendix B provides the subprime securitization amounts by 
sponsors in our sample during 1997 to 2008 (there are no new subprime issues in our sample in 
2009). Notice that subprime securitization steadily increases during the period, reaching a peak 
in 2007, followed by a steep decline in 2008 and 2009. Further, note that certain firms like Apex 
had non-zero cumulative subprime securitization amounts (SPMBS) in the initial years, but have 
zero amounts subsequently. 
Table 2, Panel A provides selected descriptive statistics at the firm-quarter level. Notice 
that the average firm is highly leveraged (0.625), which is common for financial institutions that 
constitute a majority of our sample. We also report the summary statistics of the securitization 
variables by collateral type for those firms which have non-zero values for the particular 
collateral.17 The mean values, as a percentage of total assets, are economically significant for all 
the collateral types — 25%, 29%, 3% and 35% for SPMBS, NCMBS, CMBS, and OTHBS, 
                                                          
16 In our sample, retained interests disclosure could only be found for 1,513 firm-quarters, which account for 41.1% 
of the total observations. For those interim quarter observations for which we could not find retained interests 
disclosure  in  firms’  quarterly reports, we assign the value from the most recent annual report.  
17 For SPMBS, NCMBS, CMBS, OTHBS, and RI, the descriptives are provided for firm-quarters that have non-zero 
values. For the remaining variables, the descriptive are provided for all firm quarters with available data. 
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respectively.18 For firms that have non-zero values of retained interests (RI), the mean value is 
economically material (4.7% of total assets). Table 2, Panel B provides the Pearson correlations 
between the key dependent, explanatory and control variables used for the model reported in 
Table 3, Panel A.19, 20 The patterns appear to be plausible and multi-collinearity is not a 
significant concern.21 Table 2, Panel C provides the details of our sample by industry. A majority 
(60%) of our sample comprises of financial institutions (including commercial banks, insurance 
companies, real estate and other investment firms). 
To validate our cumulative securitization measure, we replicate the data collection 
methodology in Chen et al. (2008) and compare our cumulative securitization measure (before 
partitioning by type of collateral) to the measure used in their study. Since the related data in 
Chen et al. (2008) are collected from the Y-9C regulatory reports of U.S. bank holding 
companies, we take all the firms (i.e., banks) that our dataset has in common with Chen et al. 
(2008) (438 firm quarters). The correlation between our measure of cumulative securitizations 
and the values reported in Y-9C is 0.80 (significant at the 1% level).  
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Initial Descriptive Analysis 
As initial descriptive analysis, Figure 3 plots the variance of our dependent variables for 
samples partitioned by different collateral types for the years approaching and including the 
                                                          
18 Further, note that before partitioning by collateral type, the mean of our cumulative securitization measure 
(CUMOBS) is 0.431, or 43% of the total assets of the firm. 
19 The correlations are calculated using all available firm-quarter data. For SPMBS, NCMBS, CMBS, OTHBS, and 
RI, the correlations are calculated including all the zero values. 
20 We also inspected but do not tabulate the Pearson correlation for all variables used for the model reported in Table 
6, Panels A and B. The patterns appear to be plausible and multi-collinearity is not a significant concern.  
21 In Panel B of Table 2, the Pearson correlation coefficient between STDRET and CMBS is negative, which is 
opposite to our expected sign. We have confirmed that this is due to the positive correlation between CMBS and 
LOGMV. In a simple bi-variate analysis that regresses STDRET on LOGMV and CMBS, we find that the association 
between STDRET and CMBS is positive after controlling for LOGMV. 
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financial crisis. Notice that in 2006, the variances are almost identical across collateral types. 
However, the variances explode in 2008, consistent with severe dislocations in the capital 
markets during 2008. We observe that the variances in 2009 revert back to the 2007 levels, 
reflecting the easing of the crisis in 2009. 
Further, before we present our main tests, we note that on-balance-sheet financial 
leverage (LEVi,t) is one of the most important and observable measures of the risk of financial 
institutions. Accordingly, we consider LEVi,t to be a natural benchmark to assess the significance 
of our risk-relevance results for off-balance-sheet mortgage securitizations. As a validation check 
for our methodology, we use the research design in Equation (2) to investigate potential shifts in 
the risk-relevance of LEVi,t as the crisis progressed. Untabulated analyses indicate that, as 
expected, the main coefficient on LEVi,t is positive and highly significant (p-value <0.001). 
Further, while we do not observe slope shifts in 2006 and 2007, we observe an increase in risk-
relevance for LEVi,t in 2008 and 2009, indicating heightened investor uncertainty and concerns 
about the financial stability of institutions later during the crisis. For parsimony, we do not 
include these interaction terms between LEVi,t and year indicators in our tables; however, our 
results are robust to the inclusion of these additional controls. 
Tests of H1 
Table 3 presents the results of our main regression analysis. In Panel A, the dependent 
variables in Columns I and II are STDRETi,t+1 and IMPV91i,t+1, and we use year indicators to 
detect shifts in risk-relevance. We discuss the results of the STDRETi,t+1 model. The results using 
IMPV91i,t+1, while similar, are statistically weaker. First, as expected, we observe a positive and 
significant relation between on-balance-sheet leverage (LEVi,t) and the dependent variables. 
Turning to the cumulative securitization test variables, we observe that SPMBSi,t is positively and 
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significantly (at the 1% level) related to STDRETi,t+1, reflected by the coefficient of 0.019. This 
captures the risk-relevance of SPMBSi,t for the years 2005 and prior. Further, as predicted by H1a 
and evidenced by the positive and significant coefficients (at 1%, 5%, 10%, and 1% levels 
respectively) on SPMBSi,t×YEAR_2006, SPMBSi,t×YEAR_2007, SPMBSi,t×YEAR_2008 and 
SPMBSi,t×YEAR_2009, we note that the risk-relevance of subprime securitizations increased 
during the years 2006 to 2009. The results pertaining to subprime securitizations are 
economically significant as well. Notice that as early as 2006, the risk-relevance of subprime 
securitizations is 0.074 (0.019+0.055). An inter-quartile range movement (from the first quartile 
to the third quartile) of 0.224 in SPMBSi,t in 2006 is associated with an increase in stock return 
volatility of 0.017 (0.074×0.224). Relative to mean equity volatility of 0.252 in 2006, the inter-
quartile range difference in SPMBSi,t leads to a 6.6% change in equity volatility in that year, 
which is comparable to the average impact of the on-balance-sheet leverage (7.1%). Similarly, 
the risk–relevance coefficients for subprime securitizations are 0.196, 0.307, and 0.695, 
respectively, for 2007, 2008, and 2009. Risk-relevance coefficients for SPMBSi,t equal to or 
higher than the corresponding coefficients for other predictors such as leverage are plausible as 
they reflect the risk of credit losses associated with the underlying collateral as the crisis 
approached.22 
The evidence on non-subprime backed securitizations is consistent with the notion that 
the financial crisis evolved in waves (H1b). Thus, while we notice a shift in risk-relevance of 
issues backed by subprime collateral as early as 2006, we do not expect to observe increased 
                                                          
22 Further, we have evaluated the plausibility of the regression coefficients if one were to assume the relation 
between leverage and equity volatility in Christie (1982, equation (5)). We find that coefficient estimates are 
plausible given the empirical parameters observed in our sample. In particular, we find that substituting our 
regression coefficients and sample bond spreads in the Christie (1982) model provides estimates of asset volatility 
that are quite comparable to our sample equity volatility. The calculations are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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risk-relevance for the other types of collateral studied in this paper until later during the crisis. 
Consistent with our predictions, for other non-conforming mortgage-backed securitizations, we 
observe a positive shift in risk-relevance during 2007, 2008, and 2009, reflected by the 
coefficients of 0.073, 0.385, and 0.110, respectively. As far as commercial mortgage 
securitizations are concerned, we observe significant positive shifts of risk-relevance coefficients 
during 2008 and 2009 (CMBSi,t×YEAR_2008, and CMBSi,t×YEAR_2009), reflected by the 
coefficients of 0.201 and 0.313, respectively. Regarding all other types of asset-backed issues 
(OTHBS), consistent with prior research (e.g., Niu and Richardson 2006), we observe a general 
positive risk-relevance during our sample period.  
The positive shift in risk-relevance during 2006 for SPMBS in Table 3, Panel A combined 
with the observation that the variances of STDRET and IMPV91 are rather well behaved in 2006 
in Figure 2, provides confidence that we are capturing the effect of securitization issues, and not 
merely some other correlated omitted variable. Nonetheless, we explicitly control for exposures 
other than securitizations which could lead to the same effects on the dependent variables, such 
as the firm’s  aggregate financial-crisis-related risk — proxied by total stock return over 2006 and 
2009 (RET0609i). While, as expected, RET0609i loads negatively and significantly, our key 
inferences pertaining to the risk-relevance of mortgage securitizations are unaltered. Regarding 
retained interests, we observe that RIi,t loads positively and significantly. Further, despite our 
control for year fixed effects, we allow for inter-temporal changes in macro-level uncertainty by 
employing an additional control for the quarter-end value of the VIX index. While we note that, 
as expected, VIXt is positively related to our dependent variables, its inclusion does not affect the 
main results documented in this table. To summarize, the evidence in Table 3, Panel A provides 
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support for our hypothesis that investors recognized the risk-relevance of subprime and other 
crisis-related positions as the crisis evolved.23  
In Panel B of Table 3, we replace the year dummies by delinquency indices for the 
respective mortgage collateral types and estimate the panel regression in Equation (3). We 
observe, as expected, positive and significant coefficients on the interaction terms SPMBSi,t× 
DEV_SPMBS2006,t,  NCMBSi,t×DEV_NCMBS2006,t, and CMBSi,t×DEV_CMBS2006,t, reflected by 
coefficients for the STDRETi,t model of 0.829, 0.358 and 5.215, respectively. The results in Panel 
B reconfirm the results in Panel A and suggest (consistent with H1) that the risk-relevance of 
mortgage securitizations increased as the credit performance indicators of specific mortgage 
subclasses deteriorated during the crisis.  
Tests of H2 and H3 
In Table 4, we account for another characteristic of securitizations — whether the bonds 
issued by the SPE are credit-enhanced (or guaranteed) by monoline bond insurance companies. 
As predicted in H2, the existence of a monoline guarantee can shift risk away from the S-O 
towards the monoline guarantor. We construct two firm-quarter level indicator variables, 
MNLSPi,t and MNLNCi,t,  indicating if the majority (at least 50%) of the outstanding subprime 
and other non-confirming issues (issued during the 20 quarters prior to and including the current 
quarter), respectively, were credit-enhanced by a guarantee from a monoline bond insurance 
company.24 Consistent with our prediction in H2, we find that the risk-relevance coefficients are 
lower when issues are backed by monoline guarantees. Focusing on the STDRETi,t+1 model, we 
observe that the coefficients on the interaction terms SPMBSi,t×YEAR_2006×MNLSPi,t, 
SPMBSi,t×YEAR_2007×MNLSPi,t, and NCMBSi,t×YEAR_2007×MNLNCi,t of -0.086, -0.399, and 
                                                          
23 The Variance Inflation Factors for Table 3 are less than 4, mitigating concerns about multi-collinearity. 
24 Note that it is uncommon for CMBS issues to have monoline credit enhancement.  
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-0.126, respectively, are negative and significant. The coefficients on SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2008 × 
MNLSPi,t, SPMBSi,t×YEAR_2009×MNLSPi,t, NCMBSi,t×YEAR_2008×MNLNCi,t, and NCMBSi,t 
×YEAR_2009×MNLNCi,t are insignificant, indicating that the risk-shifting effect of the monoline 
guarantee declined as the credit ratings of the monoline insurers deteriorated during the crisis. 
We can view this differential effectiveness of monoline guarantees during the crisis as yet 
another reflection of the dynamic evolution of collateral and structural characteristics of 
securitizations. 
In Table 5, we focus on commercial mortgage securitizations. Recall that as per H3, we 
expect the shift in risk-relevance of commercial mortgage securitizations to be enhanced for 
sponsors which are also the special servicers. A separate special servicer is likely to shift the risk 
away from the sponsor. In Table 6, SPSERVi,t is a firm-quarter level variable indicating that the 
sponsor is the special servicer for at least 50% of outstanding commercial mortgage 
securitizations (issued during the 20 quarters prior to and including the current quarter). Focusing 
on the STDRETi,t+1 model, we observe, as predicted by H3, that the coefficients on 
CMBSi,t×SPSERVi,t×YEAR_2008 and CMBSi,t×SPSERVi,t×YEAR_2009 of 0.616 and 1.492 
respectively, are positive and significant at the 10% two-tailed level. 
Alternative dependent variables 
In Table 6, we turn our attention to the bond markets. The regression analysis in Panel A 
of Table 6 is similar to Table 3, Panel A, except that the dependent variable is the primary bond 
spread (i.e., the average yield spread of new bond issues issued during the subsequent quarter), 
and that we control for bond characteristics (the total amount, average maturity, and average 
number of covenants for new bond issues issued during the subsequent quarter). In Panel B, the 
dependent variable is the yield spread computed using secondary trading data from TRACE 
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(measured over the subsequent quarter). The explanatory variables are the similar to those in 
Panel A, except that they pertain to bonds traded in the secondary market. In the secondary 
market tests, we additional control for the original bond coupon rate (COUPON2i,t+1) In both 
Panels A and B, we find a pronounced increase in the risk-relevance of subprime securitizations 
in 2006, followed by further incremental risk-relevance in the following years. The risk-
relevance coefficients for other non-conforming and commercial mortgage securitizations reflect 
the pattern seen in Panel A that the crisis evolved in waves. The results pertaining to subprime 
securitizations are economically significant as well – as early as 2006, the risk-relevance of 
subprime securitizations is comparable to or exceeds that of the on-balance sheet leverage. In 
additional specification checks, we have also tested H2 and H3 by using primary and secondary 
bond market spreads as dependent variables. The results (untabulated) are similar to those 
presented in Tables 4 and 5. 
In Panel C of Table 6, the main dependent variable, DISPERSIONi,t+1, is equity analysts’  
earnings forecast dispersion, calculated as the coefficient of variation of analysts’  estimates  of  
one  year  ahead  annual  earnings  during  the  subsequent  quarter’s  last  month. To the extent that the 
increase in perceived riskiness of the underlying securitization collateral increases uncertainty 
among market participants about firm value, we expect to obtain similar inferences using 
dispersion of equity analyst forecasts. The results in Panel C of Table 6 exhibit patterns similar 
to Table 3, Panel A. Thus, collectively, Tables 3 and 6 provide a nice cross-validation of our 
main predictions across different markets and settings. 
Robustness Checks 
We conduct a number of robustness checks. First, we repeat the Table 3 analysis after 
deleting non-financial firms. Note that despite focusing on mortgage securitizations in this study, 
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our main specification includes securitizations of non-mortgage assets as well to provide contrast 
between securitizations of various types of collateral, and to control for other potentially 
important sources of off-balance-sheet risk. To alleviate concerns that our results are driven by a 
stark contrast between financial and non-financial firms during the crisis, we repeat our analyses 
after deleting non-financial firms. The results (untabulated) are very similar to those reported in 
Tables 3 to 6. 
Second, we address concerns that early (2006) risk-relevance results for subprime 
securitizations are driven by mortgage banks whose business model was rendered unviable much 
earlier during the crisis. These banks were among the first to fail during the financial crisis. 
Accordingly, we repeat our analysis after deleting the three major mortgage banks in our sample 
(Countrywide, New Century, and Indymac). The results (untabulated) are very similar to those 
reported in Tables 3 to 6. 
Third, as seen in Figure 3, the variances of our dependent variables explode in 2008. 
Hence, we repeat the analyses using issues only up to 2007. Our inferences from Tables 3 to 6 
hold in this truncated sample as well. Further, the main analyses in this paper use a 91 days 
option maturity period to compute option-implied volatilities. However, our results are robust if 
we use 152 days maturity.  
  In addition, although the VIX index is included as a control in the main analyses, we re-
estimate Equations (2) and (3) using alternative specifications for inter-temporal changes in 
macro-level uncertainty: (i) using idiosyncratic volatility as an alternative dependent variable25; 
and (ii) using residualized option-implied volatility (from a regression of option-implied 
                                                          
25 Idiosyncratic volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals from a regression of stock returns on 
value-weighted market returns for each subsequent firm-quarter. 
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volatility on the VIX index). The results (untabulated) are very similar to those reported in 
Tables 3 to 6. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This study investigates the inter-temporal patterns in the risk-relevance of subprime, 
other non-conforming and commercial mortgage securitizations to equity and bond investors 
during the recent financial crisis. We observe a pronounced increase in risk-relevance for 
subprime securitizations as early as 2006. In other words, investors of subprime mortgage 
securitizers recognized the unfolding subprime risk and its impact on securitizers as early as 
2006.  
Consistent with the evolution of the financial crisis in waves, we find that the risk-
relevance of securitization issues with subprime collateral began to increase earlier during the 
crisis than the risk-relevance of other non-conforming mortgage and commercial mortgage 
securitizations. The results are robust to controlling for aggregate firm-level credit-crisis related 
risk, and on-balance sheet retained interests. Our finding that securitizations with different types 
of collateral became risk-relevant at different times as their default risk increased during the 
crisis supports the requirement of SFAS 167 to consider the former QSPEs as candidates for 
consolidation on a case by case basis, depending on the degree of risk-retention and control. 
More generally, our results inform the current debate surrounding the credit risk-retention 
requirements outlined in the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010. Our results 
corroborate proposals that contend that these mandatory risk-retention requirements need to be 
calibrated taking into account the inherent heterogeneity in the securitized asset classes. Our 
results indicate that the risk-relevance of mortgage securitizations depends, inter alia, on 
characteristics of the collateral, the structure of the securitization entity (e.g., credit enhancement 
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through monoline guarantees, or retention of a junior tranche by a special servicer), and that 
these features evolve inter-temporally. 
As mentioned in the introduction, we resorted to quasi-publicly available information 
(Asset-Backed  Alert’s   database   of   securitization   issues, 1995-2009) since disclosure in annual 
financial reports for firms other than bank holding companies was rather sparse. Our cumulative 
securitization proxies are undoubtedly imprecise relative to the true end-of period cumulative 
securitized assets of these firms; and we lack retained interests disclosures split out by collateral 
type. Nevertheless, with the measures we use, we are able to establish the risk-relevance of 
mortgage securitizations that varies inter-temporally by type of collateral, and with structural 
characteristics of the issues. Establishing the usefulness of such information supports recent 
standard-setting initiatives to expand disclosures in financial reports. These disclosures of 
securitizations and the nature of retained risks and rewards will be more precise than the 
measures we use in this study, enhancing the risk-relevance assessment by investors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
REFERENCES 
Amiram, D., W. Landsman, K. Peasnell, and C. Shakespeare. 2011. Market Reaction to 
Securitization Retained Interest Impairments during the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008: 
Are   Implicit   Guarantees   Worth   the   Paper   They’re Not Written On? Working Paper. 
Columbia University 
Aydemir, A.C., M. Gallmeyer, and B. Hollifield. 2007. Financial Leverage and the Leverage 
Effect – A Market and Firm Analysis. Working paper, Carnegie Mellon University. 
Barth, M., L.D. Hodder, and S.R. Stubben. 2008. Fair Value Accounting for Liabilities and Own 
Credit Risk. The Accounting Review 83: 629-664. 
Barth, M., G. Ormazabal, and D. Taylor. 2012. Asset Securitizations and Credit Risk. The 
Accounting Review 87: 423-448.  
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve). Report to the Congress on 
Risk Retention. October 2010. 
Bowman, R. 1980. The Debt Equivalence of Leases: An Empirical Investigation. The Accounting 
Review 55: 237-253. 
Chen,  W.,  C.    Liu,  and  S.  Ryan.  2008.  Characteristics  of  Securitizations  that  Determine  Issuers’   
Retention of the Risks of the Securitized Assets. The Accounting Review 83:1181-1215. 
Christie, A. 1982. The Stochastic Behavior of Common Stock Variances: Values Leverage and 
Interest Rate Effects.  Journal of Financial Economics 10:15-36. 
Dhaliwal, D. 1986. Measurement of Financial Leverage in the Presence of Unfunded Pension 
Liabilities. The Accounting Review 61: 651-661. 
Demyanyk, Y., and O. Van Hemert. 2011. Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis. Review 
of Financial Studies 24:1848-80. 
Dionne, G., and T. M. Harchaoui. 2003. Bank’s  Capital, Securitization and Credit Risk: An 
Empirical Evidence for Canada. Working paper, HEC Montréal. 
Ely,  K.  1995.  Operating  Lease  Accounting  and  the  Market’s  Assessment  of  Equity  Risk.  Journal 
of Accounting Research 33: 397-415.  
Gorton, G. 2009. The Subprime Panic.  European Financial Management 15: 10-46. 
Gorton, G., and  N. S. Souleles. 2005. Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization. Working 
paper, NBER. 
Gorton, G., and  A. Metrick. 2012. Getting up to Speed on the Financial Crisis: A One-Weekend-
Reader's Guide. Journal of Economic Literature50: 128-150. 
Hänsel, D. N., and J. P. Krahnen. 2007. Does Credit Securitization Reduce Bank Risk? Evidence 
from the European CDO Market. Working Paper, Goethe University Frankfurt. 
He, J., J. Qian, and P. Strahan. 2011. Credit Ratings and the Evolution of the Mortgage Backed 
Securities Market. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 101: 131-135. 
Hull, J. 2009. The Credit Crunch of 2007: What Went Wrong? Why? What Lessons Can Be 
Learned. Journal of Credit Risk 5: 3-18 
Hull, J., and A. White. 2010. The Risk of Tranches Created from Residential Mortgages. 
Financial Analysts Journal 66: 54-67  
Hull,   J.,   I.   Nelken,   and   A.  White.   2004.  Merton’s  Model,   Credit   Risk,   and  Volatility   Skews. 
Working paper, University of Toronto.  
International Monetary Fund. 2008. Global Financial Stability Report, October. 
International Monetary Fund. 2009. Global Financial Stability Report Market Update, January. 
32 
 
Keoun, B. 2008. Citigroup’s  $1.1  Trillion  of Mysterious Assets Shadow Earnings. Bloomberg. 
June 13, 2008. 
Merton, R. C. 1974.On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates.  The 
Journal of Finance 29: 449-70. 
Niu, F. and G. Richardson. 2006. Are Securitizations In-Substance Sales or Secured Borrowings: 
Capital Market Evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research 23: 1105-1133. 
Ryan, S. 2008. Accounting in and for the Subprime Crisis. The Accounting Review 83: 1605-
1639. 
Ryan, S. 2012. Risk Reporting Quality: Implications of Academic Research for Financial 
Reporting Policy. Accounting and business research 42: 295–324. 
Schwert, W. 1989. Why Does Stock Market Volatility Change Over Time? The Journal of 
Finance 44: 1115-1153. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
APPENDIX A: KEY VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable   Definition (Compustat data items  in parentheses)   Data Source 
STDRETi,t+1  Standard deviation of daily stock returns measured over 
the subsequent quarter. 
 CRSP 
IMPV91i,t+1  The average daily option-implied volatility of daily 
returns measured over the subsequent quarter (calculated 
using standardized at-the-money puts and calls options 
with 91 days duration). 
 OptionMetrics 
SPREAD i,t+1  The weighted average yield for new bonds issued during 
the subsequent quarter, minus the yield on U.S. treasury 
bills with closest corresponding maturity. If a firm has 
multiple bonds, we calculate the average yield weighted 
by principal amount. 
 Mergent FISD 
SPREAD2 i,t+1  The weighted average yield for bonds traded in the 
secondary market during the subsequent quarter, minus 
the yield on U.S. treasury bills with closest 
corresponding maturity. If a firm has multiple bonds, we 
calculate the average yield weighted by principal amount. 
 TRACE 
DISPERSIONi,t+1  Equity analysts’   earnings forecast dispersion, calculated 
as the coefficient of variation of analysts’ estimates of 
one year ahead annual earnings during the subsequent 
quarter’s  last  month. 
 I/B/E/S 
DISPi,t  Equity analysts’   earnings forecast dispersion, calculated 
as the   coefficient   of   variation   of   analysts’   estimates of 
one year ahead annual earnings during each quarter’s  last  
month.  
 I/B/E/S 
LOGMV i,t  The   natural   logarithm   of   the   firm’s   market   value   of  
equity (PRCCQ×CSHOQ). 
 Compustat 
STDEPS i,t  The standard deviation of earnings per share excluding 
extraordinary items (EPSPXQ) over the 20 quarters prior 
to and including the current quarter. 
 Compustat 
LEV i,t  The leverage ratio, calculated as total liabilities (LTQ) 
divided by total assets (ATQ). For banks, we deduct 
deposits (DPTCQ) from total liabilities to calculate LEV. 
 Compustat 
VIX t  The Chicago Board Options Exchange S&P 500 
Volatility Index at each quarter end.  
 Datastream 
RET0609i  Cumulative stock returns for each firm from 2006 to 
2009. 
 CRSP 
RI i,t  Retained interests, deflated by total assets (ATQ) at the 
fiscal-quarter end. 
 SEC Filings 
(DEV_SPMBS, 
DEV_NCMBS,  
DEV_CMBS)2006,t 
 The cumulative devaluations of the Bloomberg 60+ day 
delinquency indices (for subprime, Alt-A, and 
commercial mortgages, respectively) from the beginning 
of 2006 to the end of quarter t, as a percentage of their 
total devaluation over 2006 to 2009. Zeros are assigned 
to quarters prior to 2006. 
 Bloomberg 
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SPMBS i,t  The total dollar amount of subprime mortgage-backed 
securities issued over the 20 quarters prior to and 
including the current quarter, scaled by total assets 
(ATQ). 
 Asset-Backed 
Alert 
NCMBS i,t   The total dollar amount of other non-conforming 
mortgage-backed securities issued over the 20 quarters 
prior to and including the current quarter, scaled by total 
assets (ATQ). Other non-conforming mortgage includes 
non-agency residential mortgages (including Alt-A), high 
loan-to-value loans, non-performing mortgages, home-
equity loans, home-improvement loans, and home-equity 
lines of credit. 
 Asset-Backed 
Alert 
CMBS i,t  The total dollar amount of commercial mortgage-backed 
securities issued over the 20 quarters prior to and 
including the current quarter, scaled by total assets 
(ATQ). 
 Commercial 
Mortgage Alert 
OTHBS i,t  The total dollar amount of other assets-backed securities 
issued over the 20 quarters prior to and including the 
current quarter, scaled by total assets (ATQ). Other assets 
include credit card receivables, aircraft-lease receivables, 
auto loans, boat loans, equipment loans, etc.  
 Asset-Backed 
Alert 
CUMOBS i,t  The sum of SPMBSi,t, NCMBSi,t, CMBSi,t, and OTHBSi,t   
MNLSP i,t  Variable  indicating if the majority (at least 50% ) of the 
outstanding subprime issues (issued during the 20 
quarters prior to and including the current quarter) were 
credit-enhanced by a guarantee from a monoline bond 
insurance company. 
 Asset-Backed 
Alert 
MNLNC i,t  Variable  indicating if the majority (at least 50% ) of the 
outstanding other non-conforming issues (issued during 
the 20 quarters prior to and including the current quarter) 
were credit-enhanced by a guarantee from a monoline 
bond insurance company. 
 Asset-Backed 
Alert 
SPSERV i,t  Variable  indicating if for the majority (at least 50% ) of 
the outstanding commercial mortgage issues (issued 
during the 20 quarters prior to and including the current 
quarter), the sponsor and the special servicer were the 
same entity. 
 Commercial 
Mortgage Alert 
MATURITY i,t+1  The number of years to maturity for new bonds issued 
during the subsequent quarter. If a firm has multiple 
bonds, we calculate the average maturity weighted by 
principal amount. 
 Mergent FISD 
LOGAMT i,t+1  The natural log of the total principal amount of new 
bonds issued during the subsequent quarter. 
 Mergent FISD 
NUMCOV i,t+1  The weighted average number of covenants for new 
bonds issued during the subsequent quarter. We calculate 
the average number of covenants weighted by principal 
 Mergent FISD 
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amount. 
MATURITY2 i,t+1  The number of years to maturity for bonds traded in the 
secondary market during the subsequent quarter. If a firm 
has multiple bonds, we calculate the average maturity 
weighted by principal amount. 
 Mergent FISD 
LOGAMT2i,t+1  The natural log of the total principal amount of bonds 
traded in the secondary market during the subsequent 
quarter.  
 Mergent FISD 
COUPON2i,t+1  The weighted average coupon rate of the bonds traded in 
the secondary market during the subsequent quarter. We 
calculate the average coupon rate weighted by principal 
amount. 
 Mergent FISD 
NUMCOV2i,t+1  The weighted average number of covenants of the bonds 
traded in the secondary market during the subsequent 
quarter. We calculate the average number of covenants 
weighted by principal amount. 
 Mergent FISD 
Industry  
indicators 
  Based on industry classification in Barth et al. (2008).     
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APPENDIX B: SUBPRIME MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION (IN $ MILLIONS) 
SPONSOR 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Countrywide 0.0 4,281.2 2,214.8 3,933.0 3,233.1 4,938.8 4,424.6 37,992.8 34,966.5 26,344.9 17,401.0 171.2 139,902.0 
Lehman Brothers 0.0 0.0 3,574.6 5,382.9 1,282.4 5,793.3 4,055.5 5,882.7 10,219.1 13,742.4 13,088.4 3,439.9 66,461.2 
Washington Mutual 1,233.1 0.0 0.0 1,490.6 10,838.0 3,078.5 900.0 10,201.3 12,476.3 6,552.5 5,877.0 0.0 52,647.3 
Merrill Lynch 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 648.6 199.6 544.0 1,838.0 7,667.6 10,830.4 19,564.8 0.0 41,293.1 
Bear Stearns 459.4 114.5 600.4 1,084.2 1,340.2 2,035.8 4,416.0 4,796.5 6,373.3 6,495.1 8,576.0 0.0 36,291.6 
Goldman Sachs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4,313.7 2,538.4 8,096.2 7,179.0 7,470.3 6,459.9 0.0 36,057.6 
Morgan Stanley 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,458.6 5,432.5 1,605.3 5,250.0 0.0 4,290.9 13,862.8 0.0 31,900.1 
Citigroup 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,002.8 5,175.4 519.5 1,255.1 5,507.4 10,778.5 0.0 24,238.6 
J.P. Morgan Chase 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 433.0 6,334.7 2,453.5 1,435.4 5,976.8 6,465.3 0.0 23,098.7 
New Century Financial 0.0 3,167.3 2,340.2 1,006.2 3,940.6 1,781.6 1,566.1 0.0 6,442.2 312.6 0.0 0.0 20,556.8 
Bank of America 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,381.2 662.0 5,979.3 7,862.6 2,682.5 1,838.3 0.0 20,405.8 
Deutsche Bank 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,048.2 1,871.1 295.0 1,752.4 1,393.5 3,062.0 6,895.0 0.0 16,317.1 
Impac 0.0 0.0 252.3 943.6 1,158.3 2,675.6 5,372.3 5,887.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16,289.1 
Wells Fargo 0.0 0.0 0.0 132.8 0.0 342.0 0.0 6,270.9 4,686.1 2,755.3 983.5 0.0 15,170.5 
Barclays 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,386.8 527.9 3,442.6 7,583.4 0.0 12,940.6 
IndyMac 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 135.0 0.0 2,316.3 3,784.5 1,664.6 2,244.3 0.0 10,144.6 
Banco Popular 0.0 125.0 195.0 190.0 672.3 0.0 0.0 1,320.9 3,701.5 1,578.4 0.0 0.0 7,783.2 
Novastar Financial 264.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,196.8 1,224.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,233.8 3,185.9 0.0 7,105.1 
CIT Group 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6,644.2 0.0 6,644.2 
Fieldstone Investment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4,296.4 750.0 1,010.9 358.2 0.0 6,415.6 
ECC Capital 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5,029.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 5,029.3 
American Home Mortgage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,731.4 1,753.7 0.0 3,485.1 
Advanta 0.0 375.5 1,242.5 1,049.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2,667.7 
WMC Finance 0.0 1,896.0 236.3 405.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2,538.1 
Norwest Bank 0.0 102.2 422.5 1,896.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2,421.2 
Ocwen Financial 0.0 1,617.8 398.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 81.1 0.0 2,097.6 
Dynex Capital 0.0 1,574.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,574.2 
Thornburg Mortgage 0.0 1,144.4 0.0 150.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,294.4 
East West Bank 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 159.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 513.0 386.4 0.0 1,059.2 
Ryland 0.0 0.0 1,047.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,047.0 
Newcastle Investments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,036.3 0.0 1,036.3 
PNC 967.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 967.6 
Equity One 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 426.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 454.2 0.0 881.1 
Superior Bank 0.0 750.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 750.0 
Republic Leasing 190.8 170.0 250.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 610.9 
Compass Bank 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 591.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 591.0 
40/86 Advisors 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 236.3 344.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 581.2 
Centex 0.0 0.0 572.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 572.0 
Radian 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.5 280.7 0.0 0.0 379.2 
SunTrust 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 370.8 0.0 370.8 
Hanover Capital Mortgage 0.0 102.2 238.8 18.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 359.9 
Provident Bank 0.0 350.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 350.0 
Capstead 73.1 0.0 0.0 230.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 303.5 
Flagstar Bank 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 302.2 0.0 0.0 302.2 
Zions First National 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 277.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 277.4 
Union Planters 0.0 0.0 132.5 127.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 259.8 
Ocean Bank 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 190.0 0.0 0.0 190.0 
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette 22.1 0.0 96.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 118.3 
ITLA Capital 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 86.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 86.3 
Apex Mortgage 28.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.0 
Total 3,238.4 15,770.4 13,813.8 18,041.9 27,331.0 37,656.9 37,889.3 106,831.2 115,848.4 107,970.7 135,888.9 3,611.1 623,892.0 
 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of a Basic Mortgage Securitization Structure 
This figure illustrates a basic mortgage securitization structure. It is a modified version of Figure 3 (page 5) of Sabry 
and Schopflocher (2007).  MBS stands for mortgage-backed securities. P&I stands for principal and interest 
payments. 
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Figure 2: Variable Measurement Timeline 
This figure illustrates when each variable is measured relative to each quarter end. All variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix A.  
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Figure 3: Plot of Variance of Dependent Variables from 2000 to 2009  
This figure plots the variances of the dependent variables (STDRETi,t+1) and (IMPV91i,t+1) during 2000-2009, by 
type of collateral. The plot includes only those firm-years which have non-zero securitization deal values for the 
particular collateral type, and excludes firm-years data in the year of bankruptcy or merger. 
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Table 1:  Sample Selection 
  # of Issues 
# of Firm-
Quarters 
   Issues from 1995 to 2009 from ABS Alert (excluding CDOs)  17,315 - 
Sample for which Compustat GVKEYs are available for the sponsoring firms 12,599 9,098 
Sample with control variables from Compustat and IBES 8,989 3,687 
Sample with standard deviation of daily stock returns from CRSP 8,989 3,683 
Sample with option-implied volatilities from OptionMetrics 8,528 2,914 
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Table 2, Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
                
Variable # of obs. # of firms Mean Std 25% Median 75% 
STDRETi,t+1 3,683 217 0.407 0.226 0.228 0.34 0.511 
IMPV91i,t+1 2,914 171 0.400 0.187 0.248 0.350 0.495 
DISPi,t 3,683 217 0.073 0.131 0.013 0.028 0.072 
LOGMVi,t 3,683 217 8.332 1.914 7.025 8.303 9.726 
STDEPSi,t 3,683 217 1.186 1.773 0.377 0.675 1.256 
LEVi,t 3,683 217 0.625 0.167 0.387 0.677 0.849 
VIXt 3,683 217 20.510 5.887 14.020 19.540 26.350 
RET0609i 3,683 217 -0.308 0.516 -0.753 -0.405 0.089 
SPMBSi,t 784 45 0.247 0.599 0.011 0.034 0.165 
NCMBSi,t 1,178 63 0.288 0.368 0.019 0.093 0.552 
CMBSi,t 381 23 0.028 0.016 0.015 0.027 0.042 
OTHBSi,t 2,965 175 0.352 0.769 0.019 0.081 0.304 
CUMOBSi,t 3,683 217 0.431 0.816 0.033 0.125 0.518 
RIi,t 1,513 89 0.047 0.052 0.003 0.010 0.043 
SPREADi,t+1 756 104 2.243 3.168 0.626 1.268 2.887 
MATURITYi,t+1 756 104 7.972 5.353 4.464 7.000 10.000 
LOGAMTi,t+1 756 104 11.858 1.811 10.820 12.420 13.122 
NUMCOVi,t+1 756 104 2.295 3.607 0.000 0.000 4.000 
SPREAD2i,t+1 1,279 93 4.821 6.366 1.604 2.811 5.579 
MATURITY2i,t+1 1,279 93 11.526 5.843 8.000 10.000 13.750 
LOGAMT2i,t+1 1,279 93 12.932 1.185 12.525 12.899 13.385 
COUPON2i,t+1 1,279 93 7.282 1.943 5.896 7.026 8.306 
NUMCOV2i,t+1 1,279 93 4.797 3.965 2.000 4.000 7.000 
DISPERSIONi,t+1 3,604 212 0.089 0.175 0.014 0.029 0.079 
                        
For SPMBSi,t, NCMBSi,t, CMBSi,t, OTHBSi,t, and RIi,t, the descriptives are provided for firm-quarters that have non-
zero values. For the remaining variables, the descriptives are provided for all firm quarters with available data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2, Panel B: Pearson Correlations 
  STDRET i,t+1 IMPV91i,t+1 DISPi,t LOGMVi,t STDEPSi,t LEVi,t VIXt RET0609 i RIi,t SPMBSi,t NCMBSi,t CMMBSi,t 
IMPV91i,t+1 0.9003* 
           DISPi,t 0.3481* 0.3336* 
          LOGMVi,t -0.3683* -0.4376* -0.0631* 
         STDEPSi,t 0.2865* 0.2902* 0.4556* -0.1373* 
        LEVi,t 0.2088* 0.2039* 0.2449* -0.0715* 0.2858* 
       VIXt 0.5683* 0.5841* 0.1197* -0.1230* 0.1034* 0.0152 
      RET0609 i -0.0944* -0.1258* -0.0460* 0.1737* -0.0056 0.0700* 0.0630* 
     RIi,t 0.1035* 0.1431* -0.0464* -0.0628* -0.0116 -0.0453* -0.0145 -0.1166* 
    SPMBSi,t 0.0538* 0.0961* 0.0349 -0.1661* 0.0442* 0.0489* -0.0093 -0.1281* 0.0046 
   NCMBSi,t 0.0518* 0.0727* 0.1524* -0.1523* 0.0989* 0.1561* -0.0767* -0.2929* 0.0195 0.4461* 
  CMMBSi,t -0.1145* -0.1199* -0.0225 0.1575* -0.0245 0.0982* -0.0456* 0.0412 -0.0708* -0.0403 -0.0258 
 OTHBSi,t 0.1960* 0.1787* -0.0206 -0.2511* -0.0235 0.0653* -0.0013 -0.0931* 0.4202* -0.0157 -0.0824* -0.1086* 
The correlations are calculated using all available firm-quarter data. For SPMBS, NCMBS, CMBS, OTHBS, and RI, the correlations are calculated including all the zero values. * 
indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level (two-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2, Panel C: Industry Distribution 
 
Industry 
# of Firm-
Quarters Percent # of Firms Percent 
     Transportation & utilities 376 10.2 22 10.1 
Retail and wholesale trade 381 10.3 24 11.1 
Financial institutions 2,185 59.3 130 59.9 
Others 741 20.1 41 18.9 
Total 3,683 100.0 217 100.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
Table 3: Risk-Relevance of Mortgage Securitizations – Realized and Option-Implied 
Volatilities as Dependent Variables 
Panel A: Using year indicators to examine changing risk-relevance 
This table presents multivariate OLS regression tests of Equation (2) to analyze the risk-relevance of mortgage 
securitizations (with subprime and other collateral). The dependent variables in Models I and II are realized 
(STDRETi,t+1) and option-implied volatilities (IMPV91i,t+1), respectively. The main test variables are SPMBSi,t, 
NCMBSi,t, and CMBSit, along-with their interaction terms with indicators for the years 2006 to 2009. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. A positive coefficient on the test variables is considered to be indicative of risk-
relevance of a particular type of securitization for a given time period. T-statistics are based on standard errors 
clustered by both firm and quarter. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 
percent levels (two-tailed) respectively. 
  I.   II. 
Dependent variable =  STDRETi,t+1 
 
IMPV91i,t+1 
  Coefficients t-statistics   Coefficients t-statistics 
DISPi,t 0.267 *** 6.811 
 
0.195 *** 4.823 
LOGMVi,t -0.024 *** -7.505 
 
-0.024 *** -5.680 
STDEPSi,t 0.008 *** 2.889 
 
0.006 *   1.894 
LEVi,t 0.071 *** 3.622 
 
0.065 *** 2.997 
VIXt 0.015 *** 4.961 
 
0.013 *** 5.233 
RET0609i -0.027 **  -2.102 
 
-0.035 **  -2.433 
RIi,t 0.534 *** 2.938 
 
0.498 *** 2.697 
SPMBSi,t 0.019 *** 2.783 
 
0.028 *** 3.462 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2006 0.055 *** 2.922 
 
0.098 *** 2.883 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2007 0.177 **  1.983 
 
0.112     1.239 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2008 0.288 *   1.686 
 
0.237 **  2.299 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2009 0.676 *** 7.735 
 
0.763 *** 12.064 
NCMBSi,t -0.015     -0.956 
 
-0.016     -0.657 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2006 -0.002     -0.099 
 
0.018     1.252 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2007 0.073 *** 2.641 
 
0.083 *** 2.976 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2008 0.385 *   1.685 
 
0.002     0.019 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2009 0.110 *** 3.034 
 
0.092 *   1.916 
CMBSi,t -0.231     -0.450 
 
-0.162     -0.290 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2006 0.094     0.645 
 
-0.120     -0.976 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2007 0.215     1.614 
 
-0.180     -1.233 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2008 0.201 *** 3.814 
 
0.092     1.159 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2009 0.313 **  2.528 
 
0.190 **  2.006 
OTHBSi,t 0.024 *** 2.850 
 
0.018 *   1.747 
Intercept 0.498 *** 7.290 
 
0.329 *** 6.061 
Industry Indicators YES 
 
YES 
Year Indicators YES 
 
YES 
N 3,683 
 
2,914 
Adj. R2 0.638   0.693 
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Table 3 (continued): 
Panel B:  Using change in mortgage delinquency indices to examine changing risk-
relevance 
This table presents multivariate OLS regression tests of Equation (3) to analyze the risk-relevance of mortgage 
securitizations (with subprime and other collateral). The dependent variables in Models I and II are realized 
(STDRETi,t+1) and option-implied volatilities (IMPV91i,t+1), respectively. The main test variables are SPMBSi,t, 
NCMBSi,t, and CMBSi,t, along-with their interaction terms with Indices. DEV_SPMBS2006,t, DEV_NCMBS2006,t, and 
DEV_CMBS2006,t are devaluation percentages starting from 2006, calculated using the Bloomberg 60+day 
delinquency indices for subprime and Alt-A mortgages, and the Federal Reserve delinquency rates data for 
commercial mortgages. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are based on standard errors clustered 
by both firm and quarter. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent 
levels (two-tailed) respectively. 
  I.   II. 
Dependent variable =  STDRETi,t+1 
 
IMPV91i,t+1 
  Coefficients   t-statistics   Coefficients   t-statistics 
DISPi,t       0.230 *** 6.206 
 
0.141 *** 3.196 
LOGMVi,t      -0.028 *** -6.040 
 
-0.023 *** -5.388 
STDEPSi,t    0.006 *   1.928 
 
0.004     1.250 
LEVi,t 0.075 *** 3.601 
 
0.072 *** 3.130 
VIXt        0.015 *** 6.903 
 
0.013 *** 6.602 
RET0609i    -0.021     -1.638 
 
-0.032 **  -2.254 
RIi,t         0.450 **  2.379 
 
0.467 **  2.538 
SPMBSi,t      0.017 **  2.113 
 
0.024 *** 3.313 
SPMBSi,t × DEV_SPMBS2006,t 0.829 *** 3.542 
 
0.766 *   1.834 
DEV_SPMBS2006,t 0.345 *   1.843 
 
0.416 **  2.488 
NCMBSi,t      -0.015     -0.881 
 
-0.004     -0.176 
NCMBSi,t × DEV_NCMBS2006,t 0.358 *** 2.995 
 
0.478 **  2.248 
DEV_NCMBS2006,t 0.885 *   1.661 
 
0.105     0.166 
CMBSi,t      -0.457     -0.809 
 
-0.436     -0.743 
CMBSi,t × DEV_CMBS2006,t 5.215 *** 2.799 
 
2.524 *   1.869 
DEV_CMBS2006,t 0.544 *   1.936 
 
0.217     0.797 
OTHBSi,t      0.026 *** 2.901 
 
0.019 *   1.824 
Intercept 0.461 *** 8.247 
 
0.281 *** 4.426 
Industry Indicators YES 
 
YES 
N 3,683 
 
2,914 
Adj. R2 0.619 
 
0.658 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
Table 4: Risk-Relevance of Mortgage Securitizations: Monoline Credit-Enhancement 
This table presents multivariate OLS regressions to analyze the risk-relevance of mortgage securitizations. The 
regressions test a version of Equation (2) that is modified by the inclusion of interaction terms to study the effect of 
monoline credit enhancement. The table is similar to Table 3 Panel A, except that it provides partition results for 
issues with and without monoline bond insurance guarantees. MNLSPi,t and MNLNCi,t are firm-quarter level 
indicator variables, indicating if the majority (at least 50%) of the outstanding subprime and other non-conforming 
issues were credit-enhanced by a guarantee from a monoline bond insurance company. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. T-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by both firm and quarter. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels (two-tailed) respectively. 
  I.   II. 
Dependent variable =  STDRETi,t+1 
 
IMPV91i,t+1 
  Coefficients   t-statistics   Coefficients   t-statistics 
DISPi,t 0.251 *** 5.968 
 
0.174 *** 4.574 
LOGMVi,t -0.023 *** -6.144 
 
-0.022 *** -5.468 
STDEPSi,t 0.007 **  2.271 
 
0.006     1.507 
LEVi,t 0.073 *** 3.554 
 
0.070 *** 3.121 
VIXt 0.015 *** 4.840 
 
0.012 *** 5.384 
RET0609i -0.027 **  -2.124 
 
-0.034 **  -2.526 
RIi,t 0.527 *** 3.023 
 
0.480 *** 2.691 
SPMBSi,t 0.038 *** 4.487 
 
0.028 **  2.500 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2006  0.048 **  2.360 
 
0.125 *** 3.155 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2007 0.301 *** 2.672 
 
0.283 *** 3.569 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2008 0.208 **  2.412 
 
0.206 *   1.825 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2009 0.631 *** 5.374 
 
0.615 *** 5.805 
MNLSPi,t -0.032 *   -1.779 
 
-0.033 **  -2.063 
SPMBSi,t × MNLSPi,t -0.020 *   -1.742 
 
0.006     0.238 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2006 × MNLSPi,t -0.086 *** -2.974 
 
-0.102 *** -3.872 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2007 × MNLSPi,t -0.399 *** -7.955 
 
-0.060     -0.531 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2008 × MNLSPi,t 0.007     0.106 
 
0.017     0.460 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2009 × MNLSPi,t -0.177     -1.354 
 
0.012     0.146 
YEAR_2006 × MNLSPi,t 0.062 **  2.559 
 
0.052 *** 2.887 
YEAR_2007 × MNLSPi,t 0.058 **  2.367 
 
0.036     1.454 
YEAR_2008 × MNLSPi,t 0.025     0.380 
 
0.032     0.644 
YEAR_2009 × MNLSPi,t 0.146 **  2.213 
 
0.062     0.860 
NCMBSi,t -0.030     -1.334 
 
-0.036     -0.987 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2006  0.038     0.906 
 
0.059     1.582 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2007 0.114 *** 4.074 
 
0.125 *** 3.393 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2008 0.384 *** 4.026 
 
0.133 *   1.850 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2009 0.186 *** 3.313 
 
0.126 *** 3.084 
MNLNCi,t 0.016     0.871 
 
0.014     0.729 
NCMBSi,t × MNLNCi,t 0.011     0.441 
 
0.028     0.757 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2006 × MNLNCi,t -0.048     -0.915 
 
-0.055     -1.292 
NCMBSi,t× YEAR_2007 × MNLNCi,t -0.126 **  -2.550 
 
-0.191 *** -2.677 
NCMBSi,t× YEAR_2008 × MNLNCi,t -0.015     -0.461 
 
-0.102     -0.741 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2009 × MNLNCi,t 0.031     1.324 
 
0.595 *** 2.917 
YEAR_2006 × MNLNCi,t -0.001     -0.020 
 
-0.007     -0.348 
YEAR_2007 × MNLNCi,t 0.032     1.218 
 
0.071 **  2.217 
YEAR_2008 × MNLNCi,t -0.027     -0.395 
 
-0.016     -0.196 
YEAR_2009 × MNLNCi,t -0.307 *** -3.877 
 
-0.212 *** -3.106 
CMBSi,t -0.172     -0.351 
 
-0.129     -0.239 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2006 0.032     0.226 
 
-0.152     -1.321 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2007 -0.058     -0.211 
 
-0.444     -1.586 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2008 0.161 *** 3.124 
 
0.100 **  2.064 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2009 0.234 **  2.418 
 
0.094     1.391 
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OTHBSi,t 0.024 *** 2.877 
 
0.018 *   1.820 
Intercept 0.494 *** 7.632 
 
0.331 *** 6.167 
Industry Indicators YES 
 
YES 
Year Indicators YES 
 
YES 
N 3,683 
 
2,914 
Adj. R2 0.646  0.706 
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Table 5: Risk-Relevance of Commercial Mortgage Securitizations when the Sponsor is also 
the Special Servicer 
This table presents multivariate OLS regressions to analyze the risk-relevance of commercial mortgage 
securitizations. The regressions test a version of Equation (2) that is modified by the inclusion of interaction terms to 
study the effect of retention of a junior tranche (B piece) by the sponsor, typically observed when the sponsor is also 
the special servicer. The table is similar to Table 3 Panel A, except that it provides partition results for CMBS issues 
for which the sponsor was (was not) the special servicer. SPSERVi,t is a firm-quarter level variable indicating that the 
sponsor is the special servicer for at least 50% of outstanding commercial mortgage securitizations for that firm 
quarter. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by both firm and 
quarter. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels (two-tailed) 
respectively. 
  I.   II. 
Dependent variable =  STDRETi,t+1 
 
IMPV91i,t+1 
  Coefficients   t-statistics   Coefficients   t-statistics 
DISPi,t 0.259 *** 6.596 
 
0.188 *** 4.930 
LOGMVi,t -0.025 *** -7.119 
 
-0.025 *** -5.727 
STDEPSi,t 0.007 *** 2.709 
 
0.006 *   1.899 
LEVi,t 0.067 *** 3.374 
 
0.062 *** 2.613 
VIXt 0.015 *** 4.859 
 
0.013 *** 5.189 
RET0609i -0.025 *   -1.771 
 
-0.033 **  -2.204 
RIi,t 0.532 *** 2.925 
 
0.492 *** 2.665 
SPMBSi,t 0.021 *** 2.952 
 
0.027 *** 3.264 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2006 0.055 **  2.416 
 
0.099 **  2.520 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2007 0.170 *   1.885 
 
0.105     1.002 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2008 0.233 *   1.759 
 
0.205 *   1.953 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2009 0.630 *** 5.747 
 
0.727 *** 9.790 
NCMBSi,t -0.016     -0.953 
 
-0.014     -0.530 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2006 0.001     0.047 
 
0.018     1.031 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2007 0.075 *** 2.587 
 
0.083 *** 2.860 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2008 0.458 *** 2.963 
 
-0.006     -0.047 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2009 0.104 *** 2.760 
 
0.082     1.630 
CMBSi,t 0.061     1.020 
 
0.038     0.419 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2006 0.117     0.659 
 
-0.105     -0.654 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2007 0.095     0.416 
 
-0.212     -1.513 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2008 -0.546     -1.107 
 
-0.389     -1.466 
CMBSi,t× YEAR_2009 -0.715     -1.559 
 
-0.505     -1.418 
SPSERVi,t 0.050 *   1.774 
 
0.028     1.012 
CMBSi,t × SPSERVi,t -0.046     -0.350 
 
-0.035     -0.269 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2006 × SPSERVi,t -0.158     -0.637 
 
-0.191     -0.977 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2007 × SPSERVi,t 0.109     0.731 
 
0.150     1.248 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2008 × SPSERVi,t 0.616 *   1.660 
 
0.252     1.072 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2009 × SPSERVi,t 1.492 *   1.814 
 
1.083 *   1.702 
YEAR_2006 × SPSERVi,t 0.012     0.353 
 
0.024     0.765 
YEAR_2007 × SPSERVi,t -0.016     -0.955 
 
-0.009     -0.387 
YEAR_2008 × SPSERVi,t 0.013     0.298 
 
0.088 *   1.893 
YEAR_2009 × SPSERVi,t -0.072     -0.958 
 
-0.067     -1.012 
OTHBSi,t 0.023 *** 2.666 
 
0.018 *   1.837 
Intercept 0.512 *** 7.259 
 
0.342 *** 6.237 
Industry Indicators YES 
 
YES 
Year Indicators YES 
 
YES 
N 3,683 
 
2,914 
Adj. R2 0.641  0.695 
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Table 6: Risk-Relevance of Mortgage Securitizations – Alternate Dependent Variables 
Panel A: Primary Bond Market Spreads as Dependent Variable 
This table presents multivariate OLS regression tests of Equation (4a) to analyze the impact of mortgage 
securitizations (with subprime and other collateral) on credit spreads. The dependent variable is the weighted 
average yield spread of new bonds issued during the subsequent quarter. The main test variables are SPMBSi,t, 
NCMBSi,t, and CMBSi,t, along-with their interaction terms with indicators for the years 2006 to 2009. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. A positive coefficient on the test variables is considered to be indicative of risk-
relevance of a particular type of securitization for a given time period. T-statistics are based on standard errors 
clustered by both firm and quarter. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 
percent levels (two-tailed) respectively. 
Dependent variable =  Dep Var = SPREADi,t+1 
  Coefficients   t-statistics 
MATURITYi,t+1   0.112 *** 2.677 
LOGAMTi,t+1     0.234 * 1.712 
NUMCOVi,t+1     0.000 
 
-0.009 
DISPi,t       -2.900 
 
-1.385 
LOGMVi,t      -0.340 *** -2.721 
STDEPSi,t     0.410 ** 2.312 
LEVi,t        1.425 * 1.855 
VIXt        0.037 
 
1.272 
RET0609i    0.847 
 
1.027 
RIi,t         4.616 ** 2.213 
SPMBSi,t      5.473 * 1.707 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2006 7.527 ** 2.069 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2007 22.208 ** 2.437 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2008 8.789 *** 3.896 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2009 17.235 *** 2.747 
NCMBSi,t      -1.265 
 
-1.204 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2006 -0.952 
 
-1.293 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2007 3.970 * 1.725 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2008 6.176 *** 4.874 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2009 5.630 *** 2.724 
CMBSi,t      -2.484 
 
-0.238 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2006 11.436 
 
0.804 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2007 22.657 
 
1.246 
CMBSi,t× YEAR_2008 2.492 
 
0.695 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2009 3.054 
 
1.391 
OTHBSi,t      0.394 ** 2.267 
Intercept 6.786 *** 3.187 
Industry Indicators YES 
Year Indicators YES 
N 756 
Adj. R2 0.496 
50 
 
Table 6 (continued): Panel B: Secondary Bond Market Spread as Dependent Variable 
This table presents multivariate OLS regression tests of Equation (4b) to analyze the impact of mortgage 
securitizations (with subprime and other collateral) on credit spreads. The dependent variable is the weighted 
average yield spread of bonds traded in the secondary market during the subsequent quarter. The main test variables 
are SPMBSi,t, NCMBSi,t, and CMBSi,t, along-with their interaction terms with indicators for the years 2006 to 2009. 
A positive coefficient on the test variables is considered to be indicative of risk-relevance of a particular type of 
securitization for a given time period. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are based on standard 
errors clustered by both firm and quarter. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 , 5 and 10 percent 
levels (two-tailed) respectively. 
Dependent variable =  Dep var = SPREAD2i,t+1 
  Coefficients   t-statistics 
MATURITY2i,t+1 0.108 **  2.433 
LOGAMT2i,t+1 0.191     1.391 
COUPON2i,t+1 0.237 **  1.973 
NUMCOV2i,t+1     -0.096     -0.866 
DISPi,t       1.002     0.375 
LOGMVi,t      -0.510     -1.491 
STDEPSi,t     0.462 **  2.169 
LEVi,t        2.429 **  2.070 
VIXt        0.279 **  2.301 
RET0609i    -1.111     -1.243 
RIi,t         7.103 **  2.000 
SPMBSi,t      12.265 **  2.254 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2006 20.282 *   1.824 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2007 8.771 *   1.775 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2008 12.851     1.610 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2009 37.043 *** 2.822 
NCMBSi,t      -1.644     -0.892 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2006 -1.821     -0.724 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2007 2.353     1.495 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2008 32.483 *   1.668 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2009 9.246 *** 3.268 
CMBSi,t      -5.488     -0.309 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2006 -2.910     -0.491 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2007 11.394     0.428 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2008 5.944 *   1.733 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2009 12.004 **  2.391 
OTHBSi,t      3.084 *** 4.063 
Intercept -5.264 *   -1.681 
Industry Indicators YES 
Year Indicators YES 
N 1,279 
Adj. R2 0.524 
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Table 6 (continued):  
Panel C: Analysts’  Earnings  Forecast  Dispersion  as  Dependent  Variable 
This table presents multivariate OLS regression tests of a modified version of Equation (3) to analyze the impact of 
mortgage securitizations (with subprime and other collateral) on equity analysts’   forecast   dispersion  
(DISPERSIONi,t+1), calculated as standard deviation of analyst estimates of one year ahead annual earnings during 
next  quarter’s  last  month.  The main test variables are SPMBSi,t, NCMBSi,t, and CMBSi,t, along-with their interaction 
terms with indicators for the years 2006 to 2009. All variables are defined in Appendix A. A positive coefficient on 
the test variables is considered to be indicative of impact of a particular type of securitization for a given time period 
on analysts’   information  environment. T-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by both firm and quarter. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels (two-tailed) 
respectively. 
Dependent variable =  Dep Var = DISPERSIONi,t+1 
  Coefficients   t-statistics 
LOGMVi,t      0.002     0.276 
STDEPSi,t     0.020 **  2.420 
LEVi,t    0.090 *** 2.926 
VIXt        0.003 **  2.188 
RET0609i    -0.032 *   -1.852 
RIi,t         -0.119     -0.857 
SPMBSi,t 0.001     1.462 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2006 0.234 *   1.768 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2007 0.136 **  1.997 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2008 0.165 **  2.432 
SPMBSi,t × YEAR_2009 0.776 *** 6.399 
NCMBSi,t 0.016     0.424 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2006 0.055     0.829 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2007 0.160 *** 4.124 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2008 0.706 *** 8.747 
NCMBSi,t × YEAR_2009 0.394 *** 6.388 
CMBSi,t -0.188     -0.457 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2006 -0.052     -0.339 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2007 -0.348     -0.943 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2008 0.203     1.300 
CMBSi,t × YEAR_2009 0.238 *   1.840 
OTHBSi,t 0.003     0.364 
Intercept -0.027     -0.442 
Industry Indicators YES 
Year Indicators YES 
N 3,604 
Adj. R2 0.318 
 
 
